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When governments are in a parliamentary minority they have to negotiate with 
opposition parties over the annual budget. We argue that, as a consequence, the 
preferences of the opposition concerning fiscal outcomes should be reflected in the 
yearly budget balances. We present a theoretical argument in which the opposition faces 
a trade-off. It has a short-term interest in deficits since they can signal a weak 
government, but a long-term aversion to them because, if they reach office, they will 
have to deal with the burden of increased debt. Empirically, we find that opposition 
parties affect deficit outcomes depending on their probability of governing in the next 
term and the weakness of the incumbent government. When the opposition is mainly 
concentrated in one party, it will perceive it is likely it will take over the government 
and this will make the opposition deficit averse in the current period. However, if the 
minority government is a coalition, then a concentrated opposition might see deficits as 




















* Corresponding author: New Road, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. OX1 1NF, Oxford, United 
Kingdom. Tel.: +44 1865278663; Fax: +44 1865278621; E-mail: ignacio.jurado@politics.ox.ac.uk 
1. Introduction 
 
It has been widely argued that the phenomenon of budget deficits cannot be fully 
explained by economic variables (Volkerink and de Haan, 2001). In parallel, other 
studies have documented a trend of systematic deficits in Western economies from 1973 
until the mid-nineties. If public spending was mainly countercyclical, these deficits 
would have only been temporary tools (Barro, 1979; Alesina et al., 1992). Similarly, if 
governments were rational office seekers, they would predominantly employ them in 
pre-electoral years (Alesina et al., 1993). But none of these explanations can provide a 
complete and satisfactory account to the real-world evidence. The key question in this 
field is why governments have sometimes used them systematically by following an 
apparently incoherent pattern that finally led many countries to reach unsustainable 
levels of debt (Grilli et al., 1991; Bravo and Silvestre, 2002). 
 
Finding common patterns in the production of budget deficits beyond a purely 
economic perspective has already provided fertile ground for political economists. 
Following several seminal works published around twenty years ago (Roubini and 
Sachs, 1989; Grilli et al., 1991; Edwards and Tabellini, 1991; Roubini, 1991), an 
expanding literature has explored and analysed various political explanations for fiscal 
deficits. This paper tries to take a step forward in this area by assessing the role of an 
actor that has seldom been taken into account hitherto: the opposition.  
 
We provide evidence demonstrating that the type of opposition is key in explaining 
deficit outcomes when governments are in a parliamentary minority. Depending on the 
opposition’s likelihood of being part of a future government and the weakness of the 
minority government, oppositions will support different deficit outcomes. 
 
This article is organised as follows. In section two we claim that the influence of the 
opposition on minority governments’ performance has still not been addressed in 
sufficient detail and explain how that can be improved. Our theoretical argument and 
hypotheses are presented in the third section. Section four deals with the data and other 
methodological considerations, while section five provides our empirical results and 






2. Minority governments, oppositions, and fiscal performance: a cocktail to be 
further explored 
 
According to Strøm (1985, 1990), conventional wisdom has viewed minority 
governments as being more inclined towards political malaise, irrationality, and poor 
performance. This view may be understandable if we look back to historical events that 
could give rise to negative perceptions of minority governments. The interwar period, 
with the Weimar or the Fourth French Republics, is a clear example. However, it is 
obvious that these events do not represent today’s realities. 
 
Non-historical studies have also focused on minority cabinets’ performance. As 
D’Alimonte (1978) stresses, these assessments have been based on two traditional 
criteria: stability and legislative effectiveness. Minority governments have seldom been 
positively evaluated on either account. Some authors have empirically shown that these 
type of governments are commonly less durable (Lijphart, 1984; Warwick, 1979) since 
they may rapidly give way either to minimum winning coalitions via expansion or to 
early parliamentary dissolution (Dodd, 1976). This tendency has also been observed by 
Taylor and Herman (1971), although they found much less dramatic differences. 
Nonetheless research concerning these governments’ performance in office “is 
generally restricted to impressionistic evaluations with a largely negative flavour” and 
“[p]artly this is because there are few adequate measures of government performance” 
(Strøm, 1990: 17). 
 
One of these measures of performance may be fiscal deficits. The extent to which the 
formal composition of governments or, more generally, the fragmentation of power 
influence the likelihood and magnitude of budget deficits has inspired a considerable 
amount of research during the previous two decades (e.g. Roubini and Sachs, 1988, 
1989; Alesina et al., 1992; de Haan and Sturm, 1994; Borge, 2005). The motivation 
underlying these studies has been to address the issue of disagreement between parties 
within office. However, in that process they have overlooked the possible need for 
agreement with actors beyond government. This approach owes much to the 
contribution of Roubini and Sachs (1989), who developed a political dispersion index of 
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15 OECD countries, covering the period from the mid-sixties to the mid-eighties. Using 
this index, they identified an average gap of a 1% deficit over GDP between single party 
majority governments and minority ones (see also Alesina et al., 1992 and de Haan and 
Sturm, 1994). However, the use of this index as a single variable assumed ex ante a 
specific ranking in promoting deficits, where coalitions are more prone than single party 
governments, and minorities are more prone than coalitions. Consequently, some have 
judged these findings to be inconsistent and lacking proper robustness (de Haan and 
Sturm, 1997). 
 
Edin and Ohlsson (1991) moved a step forward by fragmenting the index and using 
each category as a single dummy in their regressions. This procedure allowed them to 
show that only parliamentary minorities are more likely to fall into budget deficits. 
Their results imply that either belonging to a majority government encourages 
politicians to be responsible or that minority governments are too weak and thus unable 
to adjust the budget. However nothing of this is mentioned in their work and therefore 
these intriguing results lack a proper theoretical explanation.  
 
Nonetheless other authors have simultaneously cast doubts on the previous findings and 
also refuted the view that more unified governments are less prone to deficits (Alt and 
Lowry, 1994) or that divided governments systematically fall into deficits (de Haan and 
Sturm, 1997). Complementing the traditional view of coalitions as big spenders (e.g. 
Jones et al., 1997), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) showed that these type of 
governments might need to satisfy their respective (more numerous) constituencies, but 
not always through deficits and irresponsible fiscal behaviour. Finally, other scholars 
have focused more on the rules and the process of passing a budget, rather than on the 
number of parties in government (Hallerberg and Von Hagen, 1999). 
 
In sum, this deficit-focused literature provides inconclusive evidence about the 
influence of specific types of governments on deficit outcomes. This probably has to do 
with the fact that the ‘type of government’ may not be a variable that produces 
particular outcomes per se, but rather its influence may depend on the interaction with 
other factors. We argue that a conditional effect is missing, namely that provided by the 
interests of the opposition. This is why we introduce this actor here as a crucial 




Strikingly, academics have paid scant attention to the role of the opposition. As 
Bingham Powell (2000: 97-98, 215) argues, it is true that when a “government has a 
solid majority and that majority has the cohesion usually necessary to sustain a 
parliamentary government, the representatives of the opposition party may have little 
impact on policy making”. But, as he also sates, when “political governing control 
conditions […] encourage the incumbent government to negotiate with them” 
opposition parties have enhanced bargaining power to influence the final outcome of 
policies. It is clear that minority governments in parliamentary democracies represent 
one of these situations. 
 
In our view, if parties in coalition cabinets have to give consent before a policy can be 
adopted, it should also be clear that (at least some) parties in opposition will have to do 
likewise in order to allow a minority government to adopt a policy. Therefore, one 
might expect that both executive and legislative coalitions (borrowing the terms of 
Laver and Schofield (1990)) should be given similar importance in the literature. 
However, we still have rather limited research to guide us in determining the extent to 
which the opposition is effectively represented in policy making (Bingham Powell, 
2000: 93). 
 
Only a few authors have explicitly considered this. For instance, Hallerberg et al. (2007) 
argue that the presence of possible alternative coalition partners in the opposition makes 
the threat to break up a governing coalition credible enough to enforce budget targets in 
ideologically diverse multiparty governments. However, this approach takes the threat 
as given and does not consider variation in the preferences of oppositions, which is what 
we do here.1 The annual ‘test’ of having the budget passed in parliament may be a 
suitable situation to enrich our knowledge about the role of the opposition in policy 
making. Provided that a minority cabinet is in office, it is reasonable to expect that the 
opposition’s preferences on deficits –in interaction with the government’s priorities– 
will shape fiscal outcomes. This remains an intriguing issue on the political science 
agenda and it is what we will try to address in the following pages. 
1 For another example on the role of oppositions, see Ganghof and Bräuninger’s (2006) analysis of the 
level of accommodation of opposition parties as compared to government parties in Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, and Germany. 
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3. Argument and hypotheses 
 
Minority governments must bargain with the opposition to pass legislation (Bingham 
Powell, 2000). Hence, if opposition parties are required to agree on a new budget, it is 
hard to imagine that the final outcome will be unaffected by their preferences. Our 
argument leaves ideology aside (i.e. holds it constant), and sees parties in parliamentary 
opposition as rational actors who only care about winning office.2 Then the question is: 
When will opposition parties be interested in a deficit and when not?  
 
The main goal of an opposition party is to take over government in the most favourable 
conditions. Hence, its decisions will be in line with this aim, including those on fiscal 
policy. This implies that when evaluating whether or not to accept a deficit budget, 
opposition parties will look at two different issues. On the one hand, they will evaluate 
the extent to which the budget outcome may help them win office (that is, harm the 
incumbent government). But on the other hand, parties are not myopic office seekers. 
They want to access power in favourable conditions in order to hold it as long as 
possible. Therefore, their behaviour will also be directed towards smoothing the 
conditions under which they will take over government. In summary, opposition parties 
have two main concerns: i) to avoid supporting budgets that do not increase their 
chances of making the current government fall, but also ii) to avoid those that worsen 
the conditions that they may eventually face when in government. 
 
The first of these opposition’s considerations has to do with the short-term 
consequences of deficits. Deficits are generally considered to reflect a mismanagement 
of resources and a signal of unstable governments. Although some authors have 
contended that deficits are necessary for countercyclical policies or public investment, it 
can generally be argued that, keeping the economic cycle constant, fiscal deficits are 
negative because they increase debt, inflation, interest rates, and current account deficit. 
To avoid such unsustainable economic paths, the strength and stability of the 
2 Notwithstanding this theoretical license, we control for the possible effect of ideology in our empirical 




                                               
government is thought to be a relevant variable. Politically weak governments tend to 
be considered as less able to undergo economic stabilisation and successful adjustment 
policies (Locke and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 1998; Franzese, 2002). Many authors have 
indeed shown how unstable and weak governments are more prone to deficits and debt, 
particularly in problematic economic contexts (de Haan and Sturm, 1994; Borrelli and 
Royed, 1995; de Haan et al., 1999; Lavigne, 2010). We will thus consider that if a 
government falls into deficit, this will signal it as being weak. Similarly, deficits may 
also indicate that the economy is undergoing a crisis. In this regard, Duch and 
Stevenson (2008) have shown that voters are not neutral to the contextual economic 
conditions, making governments accountable through more or less intense sanction 
voting. 
 
Hence, as elections are a retrospective accountability mechanism (Fiorina, 1981; 
Ferejohn, 1986),3 voters will punish the unbalanced management of resources by parties 
in government. In fact, despite the conventional wisdom is that expansionary fiscal 
policy help incumbents get reelected, when it comes to the data the opposite tends to be 
the case. Peltzman (1992) –in the United States–, Brender (2003) –in Israel–, or Drazen 
and Eslava (2010) –in Colombia– reported that in general voters prefer fiscal frugality 
and punish rather than reward loose fiscal policies, at least at the state and local levels. 
Moving to a large-cross section of countries and at the national level, Brender and 
Drazen (2008) found no evidence that deficits help for reelection. And what is more, in 
their reduced sample of developed countries (and especially in old democracies), 
deficits over the term of office and also in election years happened to decrease the 
probability that incumbents get reelected. From the opposition’s perspective, this will 
clearly be a positive outcome.4 
 
However, deficits do also have long-term consequences. Every deficit outcome today 
builds up a debt that needs to be paid in the future, plus the accumulated rate of interest. 
This can be a burden for the opposition parties if they expect to win government in the 
3 Recall that parties in office and in opposition are considered to be ideologically equal, so voters are 
assumed to vote beyond these considerations.  
4 We can assume that electoral sanctions to government parties will be voters’ electoral reward for 
opposition parties. It is true that voters may also blame the opposition for falling into a deficit since its 
consent is indispensable when a minority cabinet rules. Nonetheless, we assume throughout the paper that 
it is the government who receives the electoral sanction, at least more than opposition parties. This is 
coherent with retrospective voting theories, which generally imply that voting is a sort of referendum on 
the government’s performance; a vote for the opposition being the way to penalise it. 
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near future. Altig and Davis (1989) show, for instance, how higher levels of debt 
constrain the distributive calculations of governments. Likewise, Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990) also emphasise the inter-temporal effects of debt as a way to influence the policy 
making of future governments. Hence, future government holders will prefer to access 
office with the lower levels of debt possible, because this will give them more 
autonomy in their policy making. 
 
As a result of all this, when opposition parties are required to pass a budget, they will 
face a trade-off. On the one hand, deficits could produce short-term benefits to them. 
They may harm the incumbent government signalling its weakness and the poor state of 
the economy, and foster electoral sanctions. That would increase opposition parties’ 
chances of being in the next cabinet. On the other hand, parties in opposition will also 
take into account the shadow cast by the future. A deficit today increases debt 
tomorrow, which can be a long-term burden that they will prefer to avoid.5 Given this 
trade-off, our whole argument revolves around identifying the conditions under which 
the balance is tipped in favour of the short or long-term elements of the inter-temporal 
dilemma that opposition parties face. In particular, we propose two factors: the 
concentration of the opposition and the fragmentation of the minority government. 
 
In developing our argument, we will first consider the concentration of the opposition. 
Everything else the same, the more concentrated the opposition is in a single party, the 
higher the probability that it will be part of a future government and, in addition, the 
more likely it will hold it alone. This has both short and long-term implications. In a 
short-term calculus, when an opposition is concentrated in a single party, the electoral 
reward of voters’ sanction to government will predominantly benefit this party. 
However, in the long term, the more concentrated the opposition, the more likely it will 
have to deal (alone) with tomorrow’s debt when in government.  
 
On the other hand, these costs and benefits do not depend simply on the composition of 
the opposition. The type of minority government in office can also make deficits more 
or less profitable from the opposition’s perspective. Thus, the second factor we take into 
5 On the government’s side, decisions regarding the use of deficits and debt have been also seen as inter-
temporal strategic devices by authors like Alesina and Tabellini (1990) or Persson and Svensson (1989). 
For an empirical test of their hypotheses, see Pettersson-Lidbom (2001). 
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account is the level of fragmentation within government. From the perspective of 
opposition parties, what matters is whether or not a deficit harms the government, 
giving them the opportunity of fighting in an election they can win. According to Strøm 
(1990), the higher the fragmentation of a government, the more likely it will fall under 
traumatic circumstances. Hence, a fragmented minority government will find it hard to 
survive budgetary deficits and, more generally, economic crises. 
 
We contend here that parties in opposition are interested in deficits in the short term 
because they signal the government as weak. Thus, if the latter is more fragmented it 
will make deficits even more attractive. A higher fragmentation within the government 
would, as a result, tend to tip the balance in favour of the first part of the trade-off 
making opposition parties more prone to accept deficits. On the other hand, a low 
fragmented minority government would find it relatively easy to deal with a deficit, 
making the fall of the government less likely. As previous scholars have shown, this 
type of cabinet does not have to reconcile internal heterogeneous preferences, being 
both less likely to run budget deficits and more able to cope with them in the event that 
they are produced. Hence, a concentrated opposition will push for a more balanced 
budget that would leave the fiscal accounts in a better shape for the next term. 
 
As a consequence, and considering all the things said to this point, (i) the more 
concentrated an opposition, the more each of its parties will be interested in the short-
term benefits of deficits if the government is already a fragile one (namely, fragmented), 
but (ii) if the government is strong enough (i.e. not fragmented), a highly concentrated 
opposition will make the long-term costs of deficits weigh more. Thus, the effect of 
concentration in opposition runs in two opposite directions depending on the type of 
minority government they face. This leads us to pose two conditional hypotheses to be 
tested empirically: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When a low fragmented minority government is in office, higher 
concentration of the opposition decreases the likelihood of deficits. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  When a highly fragmented minority government is in office, higher 





4. Data and methodology 
 
Most of the data used in this paper is drawn from two different databases. In the first 
place, most political variables are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI: 
Beck et al., 2001). The remaining variables, mostly economic, come from the 
Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS: Armingeon et al., 2005). We concentrate our 
research on the period for which we have all the relevant data (1976-2000). Our full 
sample covers twelve parliamentary OECD democracies.6 
 
This work is substantively interested in how several political variables (related to 
government’s and opposition’s characteristics) affect the national accounts in terms of 
the production of deficits. Hence, the empirical dependent variable used in all the 
statistical analyses is the annual deficit (primary government balance) as a percentage of 
GDP, taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database as compiled in the CPDS. To 
ease the interpretation of the regression parameters, we have recoded the original 
variable so that it is positive when there is a deficit, and negative when there is a budget 
surplus. 
 
We use two key independent variables to explain the way oppositions affect budget 
deficits. First, we need to account for the Concentration in Opposition. As this is the 
crucial variable in this article, we do not want our results to be driven by the choice of a 
specific measure and thus we use three different ones. Each of them captures different 
sides of the same phenomenon: whether the parties in opposition perceive as likely that 
they will be the ones taking over governmental responsibilities alone when the current 
cabinet terminates. 
− Herfindahl Index (HI): this index is typically used to measure the degree of 
industrial concentration. In our case, it is calculated as the sum of the squared 
6 We concentrate on parliamentary democracies, because it is where oppositions are salient and relevant. 
Moreover, there is a large literature that shows that in presidential countries, compared to parliamentary 
ones, the interests of the legislators will be often much more divergent from the interest of the presidential 
candidates. On the other hand, in parliamentary democracies party discipline tends to be higher, and we 
are specifically interested in the behaviour of government and opposition parties as unitary actors. The 
sample is limited to the twelve countries for which we have data for all the variables we include in the 
analyses: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
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seat shares of all parties in opposition. The higher the resulting value, the higher 
the concentration. 
− Picking Probability Index (PPI): this measure is based on the probability that 
two legislators picked at random from the whole parliamentary opposition will 
belong to the same party. Again, the higher the index, the higher the 
concentration. 
− Largest Opposition Party Size (LOPS): this variable directly captures the size of 
the largest opposition party through the share of opposition seats it holds in 
Parliament. Obviously, the larger the party, the more concentrated the opposition 
will be.7 
 
Hence, all variables are an increasing measure of opposition’s concentration. As said, 
the reason why we offer the analyses with three different measures of our main 
independent variable is to provide enough robustness checks to be confident in the 
empirical results. 
 
Secondly, we have to account for the influence of the type of government on deficits. In 
our opinion this question has been unsatisfactorily answered in the empirical literature 
because of the wide variety of approaches and results. As presented in the argument, we 
want to distinguish minority cabinets by their strength, which we have claimed to be 
related to fragmentation. We have assumed that a logical cut-off point is whether the 
cabinet is held by a single party minority government or by a coalition minority 
government. In the former, party unity acts as glue that keeps the government stronger 
vis à vis difficulties. However, in coalition governments, different preferences have to 
be reconciled. Therefore, it is more likely that they behave fiscally loosely to satisfy 
different constituencies and, in case they need to adjust, they will be more prone to 
disagree and cause the government to fall. We analyse the performance of these types of 
governments in comparison to majority cabinets (using single party majority 
governments as a reference category and controlling for coalition majority 
governments).8 The potential influence of the opposition on minority governments is 
also restricted by how far the government is from a majority. Then, the variable margin 
7 We have also used another version of this variable (LOPS), by calculating the size of the largest 
opposition party directly through its seat share in Parliament. The results are basically similar. 
8 Due to the reduced number of cases and lack of clear theoretical expectations, caretaker governments 
are not included in the statistical analyses. 
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to absolute majority is the percentage of seats that the sum of parties in the minority 
government need to achieve the threshold of the absolute majority (taking the value 0 if 
all parties in office sum 50% or more of the seats). 
 
To properly account for the influence of the previous government and opposition 
variables and isolate their causal effect, we include sets of different controls. First, we 
account for economic variables and the most commonly recognised as automatic 
stabilisers (Roubini and Sachs, 1989): (1) the previous year deficit, in order to isolate 
unitarily the main autoregressive component of the model, (2) the annual real GDP 
growth as a natural smoother of deficits,9 (3) long-term interest rates as the price that 
governments pay for the current debt and expect to pay for a deficit, (4) the 
unemployment rate, since it expresses the possible economic and social circumstances 
of a country that may extraordinarily impel budget deficits in a specific year,10 (5) 
openness (trade and capital restrictions), since increased international economic 
exposure undermines the stabilization function of fiscal policy and fiscal regulation 
(Jensen and Jensen, 1995). We operationalise this last variable as the sum of two 
indexes of the Comparative Political Data Set: an index of the restrictions on payments 
and receipts of goods and invisibles (which ranges from 0 to 8) and an index of the 
restrictions on payments and receipts of capital (which ranges from 0 to 4). This gives 
as a total account of the openness of the economy. 
 
The second set of control variables addresses the issue of political opportunism and 
stability. First, we consider the incentives to spend when elections are close. There is an 
large theoretical literature on political budget cycles (e.g. Alesina et al., 1993, 1997; or 
Alesina and Roubini, 2008), while empirically there is inconclusive evidence on them 
(Andrikopoulos et al., 2004). Including this variable, we avoid the potential bias caused 
by governments’ tendency to increase deficit-financed expenditures just before 
elections.11 Apart from budget cycles, this variable also controls for the possibility that 
9 Here we only consider this direction of the causal relationship as a control, although it is true that fiscal 
policy may well affect GDP growth in the first place (see for instance Romero-Ávila and Strauch, 2008; 
or Afonso and Furceri, 2010). 
10 This is the unemployment series standardised for comparison as provided by the CPDS. For those 
observations for which the OECD did not provide the standardised unemployment rate, we used the 
unstandardised one (the correlation between the two is 0.98). 
11 It is true that manipulation of fiscal policy in election years need not be reflected in the overall deficit 
but only in the spending composition (see for instance Vergne, 2009). Nonetheless, we believe it is a 
relevant control for our models. 
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minority governments were more likely during election years.12 Although the standard 
procedure is to include a dummy of whether elections were called in a given year, there 
are potential problems associated with that approach. Take, for instance, the case in 
which an election takes place in January. The afore-mentioned method would code that 
year as a whole electoral year despite the fact that only one of its months was a pre-
electoral one. Instead, we have calculated the pre-electoral year share, that is, the share 
of each year that belongs to the 365 days previous to an election, which should better 
capture the influence of elections on spending incentives.13 
 
In addition, we include the number of changes in government in each year to account 
for the general political instability in the country, assessing whether or not unstable 
environments, in which the members of the cabinet may feel insecure with their posts, 
lead to higher deficits. We also control for the potential influence of the 
disproportionality of the electoral system.14 Governments in non-proportional systems 
are said to spend less (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002) and produce fewer deficits (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2004).  
 
Another set of control variables reflects the incentives of governments to increase their 
spending. We first include a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if there are one or 
more parties in the executive representing special interests (regionalists, nationalists, 
religious, or rural parties), and 0 otherwise. The rationale is that these parties have more 
incentives to spend public resources on specific constituencies and, therefore, will be 
less fiscally responsible. The partisanship of the cabinet is also taken into account. 
Right-wing cabinets are taken as reference category. This way we can analyze two 
possible partisanship effects. First, by including a dummy variable for left cabinets, we 
can control for the claim that leftist governments either fall more frequently into deficits 
or undertake less fiscal adjustments (Volkerink and de Haan (2001) show this is the 
case, at least in the seventies). In addition, following Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1996), a 
variable for centre cabinets is also included in the analysis. Their argument is that 
centre governments tend to hold the median position in the legislature and therefore, 
12 Nevertheless, this endogeneity problem is rather unlikely to be present since the correlation between 
minority governments and election years is almost zero. 
13 We want to thank a reviewer for this suggestion, which we believe is theoretically more sound than 
introducing the standard dummy for an electoral year. 
14 Index of disproportionality according to the formula (least squares) proposed by Gallagher (1991). 
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even in a minority cabinet, can pit the interests of left and right parties in the opposition 
against each other and be more able to pass the budget they prefer. 
 
Finally, we also need to control for the contextual dimension in deficits. Around the 
early nineties, deficits were systematically reduced in all countries.15 Therefore, it is 
relevant to account for the context that can undermine or strengthen the political and 
economic incentives to fall into deficit. A context requiring more fiscal responsibility 
increases the constraints faced by bargaining parties and thus makes the game of 
domestic politics less relevant for deficit production. In this regard, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003: 179) claimed that the 1990s were a time of “budgetary consolidation” 
as opposed to previous decades. From then on, international organisations promoted 
adjustment programmes and supranational integration required convergence and 
balanced budgets, consolidating a non-deficit paradigm all over the developed world 
(Stiglitz, 2002; DeLong and Eichengreen, 2002; Simmons et al., 2006).16 
 
In a similar vein, Hallerberg et al. (2004, 2007) showed that given this time-
idiosyncratic conditions which make policy-makers (and also voters) more deficit-
averse, European countries centralised budget decision-making procedures in order to 
be able to cut deficits down (see also Lavigne, 2010). To control for these contextual 
conditions, we include in all the analyses Braüninger and Hallerberg’s (2006) forms of 
fiscal governance,17 which account for the rules by which fiscal decisions are adopted in 
a government. This variable shows an increasing trend to more centralisation of the 
fiscal decisions from the nineties on. It thus lets us control for the change in the policy 
paradigm regarding deficits, by which the decisions on budget balances are centralised 
to encourage fiscal stringency. The variable has three categories: Fiefdom (which is the 
reference category in the models), Delegation, and Contract.18 We have taken the 
descriptions and coding of these variables from Bräuninger and Hallerberg (2006).19 
15 For example, in a sample of twenty-three OECD countries included in the Comparative Political Data 
Set, before 1993 the average budget deficit is almost 1%. For the period 1994-2004, the average was 
around a 1.5% surplus. 
16 This is in line with the contributions made by the literature on international diffusion of policies which 
claims that globalisation implies an imitation model that fosters the application of similar orthodox 
policies (see for instance Przeworski and Meseguer, 2002; or Simmons et al., 2006). 
17 The coding rules of this variable come from Hallerberg (2004) and are based upon interviews for the 
book as well as earlier versions that appeared in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and Hallerberg et al. 
(2001). 
18 Fiefdom refers to the situation in which the full cabinet makes budget decisions, and in practice 
ministers support each other’s budget bids so that they generally get what they want. Under delegation, 
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Regarding the methodology, the statistical models are the commonly used time-series 
cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions with panel-corrected standard errors 
(Beck and Katz, 1992), controlling for the fact that the deficit-generating process is 
notably dynamic with a Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) model.20 Authors like Beck 
and Katz (2004) or Keele and Kelly (2006) make a case for the parsimony of LDV 
models compared to others. Fixed-country effects are included in the specifications of 
all the econometric models to control for how institutional differences across countries 
(those not already included in the models) might affect governments’ budget balances.21 
Finally, to control for any remaining time effects and different propensities to generate 





To recap, this paper has focused on how opposition parties’ preferences affect deficit 
outcomes when the government is in a minority. We have claimed that their preferences 
are defined by their perceived probability of having to deal with the future burden of 
deficit. We also claim that this effect is conditional on the type of minority government 
in office. The statistical tests of the argument yield the estimations presented in Table 1. 
We run three different models with each of the three different measures of concentration 
spending ministers delegate budget-making powers to a central player, the finance minister. She 
centralises the budget-making process, with negotiations generally taking place bilaterally between the 
finance minister and any spending minister. In this scenario, spending ministers have much less say over 
their final budget allocation. In the latter case, known as contracts, the political parties commit 
themselves to spending targets for the life of the government. The agreement includes detailed rules that 
explain what changes are to be made to the budget given changing macroeconomic conditions. In this 
case, the ministers are, in effect, simply managers of budgets that the agreement already sets.  
19 We could have opted for even more detailed measures regarding budgetary institutions (see the 
electronic appendix of Hallerberg et al., (2007)). However, for these measures we only had very few 
points in time available (1991, 2001, and 2004). Given that our time scope ranges from 1976 to 2000, we 
clearly needed the temporal variation that the coding of the forms of fiscal governance that we finally 
used gave us. Besides, we believe the latter variable nicely summarizes many important features of the 
budget process. 
20 Since Durbin-Watson and Drukker (2003) tests showed that there was some serial autocorrelation, we 
control for panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure. 
21 Hausman tests were run and revealed that it was not possible to assume random effects for all models, 
although the coefficients of the substantively interesting variables were similar in both fixed and random 
effects specifications. As Beck (2005) argues, in dynamic panel models (with LDV) and fixed effects, it is 
well known that the fixed effects will downwardly bias the coefficient of the independent variables. This 
is known as Hurwicz or Nickell bias (see also Nickell 1981), but according to Beck (2005), the problem is 
much less serious for TSCS data as compared to panel data, especially when the number of years in the 
sample is reasonably high; as it is in our case. 
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in the opposition, what gives a total of nine columns. The first model displays the full 
specification without the substantively relevant interactions. In the second model, we 
provide the interactions between the type of minority government and each measure of 
opposition’s concentration. Finally, as a robustness check, the third model presents a 
more parsimonious specification run only with the significant controls apart from the 
variables of interest. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Firstly, a brief comment on the control variables is in order. In general they perform as 
expected in the literature (see for instance Bohn, 1998). Higher economic growth makes 
deficits less likely by acting as an automatic economic stabiliser. Growth increases 
governments’ revenue as a consequence of more intense economic activity in the 
country. The opposite effect results from increasing unemployment rates, since 
governments find themselves required to spend more in compensation payments. In 
accordance to Knot and de Haan (1995), we also find a negative relation between higher 
interest rates and deficits, as the latter can crowd out national saving and pressure 
upwards the former. Openness, on the other hand, is the only economic variable that 
does not reach conventional levels of significance. 
 
The estimates for the variables capturing the fiscal governance form are highly 
significant and in the expected negative direction. Delegation and contract (as opposed 
to fiefdom) serve as a means towards fiscal discipline, as argued in Bräuninger and 
Hallerberg (2006).22 
 
Among the political control variables, only the number of changes in government shows 
a statistically significant effect as, quite logically, instability and deficit production go 
hand in hand. The effect of executives’ partisanship, in its two versions (left 
government and special interests), has the expected sign, but does not reach standard 
levels of statistical confidence, confirming previous findings that show that partisanship 
is not a crucial determinant of deficits (de Haan and Sturm, 1997; Heller, 1997). 
22 A Wald test yields that, although the Delegation coefficient is higher than the Contract one, both 
coefficients are not statistically different at the 95% level of confidence. Hence, both fiscal decision 
institutions are clearly superior to Fiefdom in terms of deficits, but Delegation cannot be said to be better 
than Contract at reducing deficits.  
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Likewise, in the full models we find no evidence in favour of Laver and Shepsle’s 
(1990, 1996) argument on the influence of centre cabinets’ pivotal role in the generation 
of fiscal (im)balances. We do however find a significantly positive effect in the more 
parsimonious specification. Finally no relationship between proportionality of electoral 
rules and budget deficits appears to emerge either. 
 
Yet the most relevant political variables for the aim of this study are the type of 
government and opposition, which relate to our hypotheses. As it can be seen in the first 
model, having a single party minority government does not exert any statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood or magnitude of a deficit compared to single party 
majority governments. Strikingly, these first findings go in the opposite direction of 
many previous studies that have supported the weak government thesis. Our 
interpretation of this evidence is that, whereas it may be true that minority governments 
have to satisfy more constituencies than their own and therefore probably increase 
spending, it is also true that they will face more checks in doing so, especially if faced 
with a deficit-averse opposition. On the other hand, a single party majority cabinet (the 
reference category) might be more proficient at keeping spending down, but it may also 
encounter fewer constraints than other types of governments to run deficits in case they 
need them. The fact that these two effects may cancel each other out might explain the 
lack of differences between single party majorities and minorities.23 
 
The story for coalition minority governments is rather different though. As compared to 
single party majority cabinets, non-majoritarian coalitions seem to produce higher 
deficits.24 This can be seen in model 1. This finding would be in line with the studies 
that predict minority governments and coalitions to be more unstable and prone to fiscal 
mismanagement. However, this article hypothesises that the effect of any minority 
government on deficits should be conditional on the structure of parliamentary 
opposition. This mutual influence arises because minority governments need the support 
of a part of the opposition to pass a budget, and, at the same time, the incentives of 
23 In normative terms, these results support Strøm’s (1985, 1990) challenge of the conventional view 
when he stresses that minority governments can be said to leave a surprisingly favourable impression 
when their record is analysed. “At the very least, it is not clear that the[ir] bottom line is negative, either 
for parties considering participation in such cabinets or for the political system as a whole” (Strøm, 1990: 
131). 
24 This is somewhat further supported by the positive coefficient of the variable Coalition Majority 
Cabinet, although it is only statistically significant in the models with the interactions. 
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oppositions to behave in a certain way (more or less cooperative/belligerent with respect 
to budget deficit outcomes) depend on the characteristics of the other bargaining side 
(the minority government). 
 
This conditional argument of the opposition’s role is tested in model 2, which provides 
empirical support to it. In the first place, we can observe the interactive effect with 
coalition minority governments. The principal component is not significant anymore. 
That is, when the opposition is totally fragmented, these executives are not significantly 
different to single party majority governments as regards the production of deficits. The 
effect found in model 1 seems to be entirely due to the role of opposition concentration, 
which is normally overlooked as a relevant actor. As we can see, the interaction 
Minority Government (Coalition) * Concentration in Opposition is consistently highly 
positive and significant in the three specifications of the opposition variable. In other 
words, only when the opposition’s concentration increases, coalition minority 
governments tend to run higher deficits. Hence, it appears that when a minority 
government is fragmented (namely, weaker), then a concentrated opposition is 
especially interested in pushing the executive to fall into deficit despite its inter-
temporal calculus of possibly having to pay the future debt.  
 
The other part of our argument is captured by the interaction Minority Government 
(Single Party) * Concentration in Opposition. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient estimates in their three specifications suggest that, when concentrated 
oppositions face single party minority governments, they weigh the long-term negative 
effects as being more important than the short-term benefits of passing a deficit budget 
bill. This is well in line with the expectation derived from the first hypothesis. 
 
To account for the stability and robustness of the estimations, we run a third model in 
which we drop the non-significant variables. As it can be seen, the magnitude of the 
effects and their level of significance remain quite similar. Moreover, dropping one by 
one the insignificant variables, centre executives gain significance. More importantly, 
the interactions between types of minority governments and opposition concentration 




Although the information offered in the tables might be clear enough, following 
Brambor et al.’s (2006) guidelines, it is also useful to provide the graphical results,. 
This helps assessing the significance of the effects for the whole range of values of the 
main independent variables. We take the specifications of model 3 (the parsimonious 
model) using the Herfindahl index as the measure of opposition’s concentration.25 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The two figures above clearly show the interactive effects of interest. The two marginal 
effects’ lines have divergent slopes as a result of the different conditional effect of 
opposition’s concentration on deficits depending on the particular type of minority 
government in office. In Figure 1 we can see that under single party minority cabinets, 
concentration in opposition has a negative effect on deficits. A change from the 
minimum value of our index to its maximum entails around a 3% expected reduction in 
deficit (from an average increase of the deficit of almost 2% to an average reduction of 
over 1%), compared to single party majority governments (the reference category).26 
 
Opposition’s concentration has the reverse effect when a minority coalition is in office. 
In general, decreasing fragmentation of the opposition in this scenario makes the 
production of budget deficits more likely. In Figure 2, the predicted value of our 
dependent variable changes from a slight deficit reduction to an average deficit increase 
of over 5% in response to a change from the minimum to the maximum value of 
opposition’s concentration. 
 
To account for the reliability and robustness of the previous results we have undergone 
two further tests. Firstly, we have rerun the analyses above keeping only the minority 
governments in the sample. The previous analyses were actually showing the interactive 
effects of minority governments and oppositions compared to the deficit outcomes of 
single party majority governments, which were the reference category. Here, we want to 
25 The figures are highly similar with either of the other two variables measuring the concentration in 
opposition. These figures are available upon request. 
26 In interpreting these graphs, we must recall that the deficit variable is coded to make it increase with 
deficits. That is, a deficit is coded as positive and a surplus as negative. 
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evaluate the effect of opposition concentration by looking at minority governments 
only, comparing coalition and single party cabinets. That is what we do in Table 2 by 
restricting the sample to minority governments. As this sample is substantially smaller 
than the full sample, we run the reduced model (model 3) without year dummies (which 
after controlling for the form of fiscal governance are always insignificant) so as to keep 
some degrees of freedom more.27 Although due to the reduced number of observations 
some control variables lose their statistical significance, the results concerning 
oppositions go in the expected direction. The interaction between coalition minority 
governments and opposition’s concentration is positive and significant, which implies 
that a concentrated opposition will be more likely to concede deficits if the government 
is a minority coalition rather than a single party minority one. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Secondly, to test to which extent our results are driven by the influence of specific 
outliers, we have generated an added-variable plot on the results of Table 2. More 
concretely, we plot the effect, observation by observation, of our independent variable 
of interest (in this case, the interaction between type of minority government and 
opposition concentration) in order to see if the slope is decisively driven by concrete 
minority governments. Figure 3 shows the plot for the model with the Herfindahl index 
as a measure of opposition concentration.28 As it can be seen, the scatter follows a 
positive slope (positive and significant effect; t=2.32) and there are no clear problematic 
observations.29 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These robustness checks come to further support the evidence shown previously. 
Consistent with our argument, therefore, opposition parties seem to be key in explaining 
fiscal deficits when a minority government is in office, though in ways that are not 
27 As one can see, the analyses are run on 69 observations, what means that about a 27% of the ‘country-
years’ in our full sample are considered to be under the rule of a minority government. 
28 We use the Herfindahl index to be consistent with Figures 1 and 2, but the plots with the other 
measures of concentration are very similar. 
29 It is true that in the upper part of the graph there are two observations that could be seen as potential 
outliers pushing the positive relation (Denmark 1992, and Sweden 1982). All the empirical analyses have 
been rerun dropping these cases and they remain essentially unchanged. We have also analysed the 
residuals and they seem to follow no systematic pattern. 
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immediately apparent. Concentrated oppositions push multiparty minority cabinets to 
fall into higher deficits. However, they would not allow a single party office to do so in 
order to be in a good position in the event they win office in the following elections. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The argument presented in this paper makes a case for taking into consideration the 
opposition’s incentives and far-sightedness. Whereas it is true that a non-myopic 
opposition will take into account the future damage that a current deficit may cause, it is 
also true that it will encounter a tension with its potential short-term benefits 
(weakening the current government, for instance).  
 
Empirically we have shown that when the opposition’s support is required to pass the 
budget, it will push for deficits if it is sufficiently concentrated and it is contesting a 
fragile government. We theorised that this happens because such a government can be 
weakened by running a deficit so that parties in opposition can benefit from the 
electorate’s reaction without having to share much among them. However, if the 
minority government is stronger (which we relate to single party governments), then the 
opposition will take the future burden of debt more into consideration. In such a 
situation, the more likely the opposition believes it will rule in the next legislature, the 
more they will push for non-deficit outcomes as they want to avoid paying the future 
debt.  
 
As a corollary, we believe that this study contributes to previous research in the field 
through the analysis of budget deficits considering not only the governmental actor, but 
oppositions and their rational calculi as well. Whenever an opposition is required in 
order to pass the budget, its preferences should be reflected in the final outcome. We 
believe this framework could be extended to the study of other areas of governmental 
action and show when the opposition might be able to impose its preferences. In 
addition, we also think that this kind of reasoning might also be applicable to all those 
contexts where more than one party has to give consent to a deficit production. In 
coalition governments different parties might have different inter-temporal concerns 
and, depending on the extent to which they believe they will participate in future 
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governments, they may push for a particular outcome in one direction or the other. 
More qualitative evidence on the preferences and rationale behind oppositions’ 
decision-making could also be provided to complement the findings hitherto presented. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 – Regression analyses 
 Model 1: Basic Model Model 2: Full Model with Interactions Model 3: Reduced Model 
 HI PPI LOPS HI PPI LOPS HI PPI LOPS 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
0.618*** 0.618*** 0.617*** 0.638*** 0.636*** 0.629*** 0.639*** 0.637*** 0.631*** 
[0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054] 
GDP Growth 
-0.136** -0.137** -0.138** -0.177*** -0.176*** -0.170*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.188*** 
[0.054] [0.054] [0.054] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] 
Interest 
0.192*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.114* 0.121* 0.128* 0.107 0.112* 0.119* 
[0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.065] [0.066] [0.065] [0.067] [0.067] [0.065] 
Openness 
(Trade & Capital Restrictions) 
0.096 0.095 0.089 0.073 0.068 0.056    
[0.072] [0.072] [0.075] [0.077] [0.077] [0.078]    
Unemployment Rate 
0.189*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.140** 0.141** 0.145*** 
[0.059] [0.059] [0.058] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.055] [0.055] [0.056] 
Electoral System 
Disproportionality 
-0.032 -0.031 -0.034 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017    
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042]    
Preelectoral Year Share 
-0.413 -0.409 -0.404 -0.219 -0.233 -0.199    
[0.320] [0.320] [0.320] [0.309] [0.310] [0.315]    
Number of Changes 
in Government 
0.556*** 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.452*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.389*** 
[0.151] [0.151] [0.152] [0.146] [0.147] [0.149] [0.122] [0.122] [0.124] 
Special Interests in Executive 
1.752 1.802 1.861 1.560 1.580 1.628    
[1.237] [1.251] [1.237] [1.102] [1.116] [1.100]    
Left Executive 
0.044 0.036 0.024 0.250 0.212 0.219    
[0.210] [0.212] [0.213] [0.205] [0.210] [0.205]    
Centre Executive 
0.075 0.050 0.039 0.609 0.553 0.574 1.013** 0.996** 1.016** 
[0.451] [0.464] [0.421] [0.443] [0.457] [0.418] [0.409] [0.411] [0.406] 
Form of Fiscal Governance 
(Delegation) 
-1.898*** -1.902*** -1.946*** -1.944*** -1.930*** -2.026*** -1.858*** -1.853*** -1.912*** 
[0.441] [0.441] [0.481] [0.402] [0.404] [0.435] [0.442] [0.441] [0.467] 
Form of Fiscal Governance 
(Contract) 
-0.962*** -0.955*** -0.948*** -0.932*** -0.921*** -0.859*** -0.939*** -0.926*** -0.870*** 
[0.268] [0.268] [0.264] [0.276] [0.278] [0.270] [0.270] [0.270] [0.266] 
Coalition Majority Cabinet 
0.515 0.506 0.501 0.846* 0.790* 0.823* 0.895** 0.869** 0.913** 
[0.432] [0.432] [0.426] [0.435] [0.433] [0.432] [0.434] [0.432] [0.438] 
Margin to Absolute Majority 
-2.556 -2.612 -2.665 -4.093 -4.097 -4.849 -3.461 -3.486 -4.338 
[3.417] [3.420] [3.415] [3.512] [3.549] [3.533] [3.647] [3.656] [3.684] 
Minority Government 
(Single Party) 
0.082 0.077 0.073 1.607 1.410 2.279* 1.598 1.464 2.453* 
[0.427] [0.427] [0.426] [1.052] [1.028] [1.256] [1.055] [1.026] [1.277] 
Minority Government 
(Coalition) 
1.882*** 1.879*** 1.911*** -0.643 -0.627 -1.038 -0.724 -0.705 -1.064 
[0.488] [0.487] [0.493] [1.016] [1.030] [1.370] [0.980] [0.991] [1.323] 
Concentration in Opposition 
-0.154 -0.252 -0.457 -0.553 -0.549 -0.720 -0.159 -0.155 -0.300 
[0.921] [0.933] [0.993] [0.872] [0.871] [0.950] [0.823] [0.808] [0.877] 
Minority Gov. (Single Party) * 
Concentration in Opposition 
   -3.255* -2.802* -3.583** -3.377* -3.040* -3.985** 
   [1.773] [1.677] [1.718] [1.794] [1.691] [1.761] 
Minority Gov. (Coalition) * 
Concentration in Opposition 
   6.799*** 6.691*** 5.876*** 6.853*** 6.836*** 5.878*** 
   [1.953] [2.012] [2.092] [1.977] [2.027] [2.094] 
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.840 0.839 0.839 
Panel-corrected standard errors in brackets. Country and Year dummies not shown. 





Table 2 – Regression analyses (Only Minority Governments) 
 Model1 Model 2 
 HI PPI LOPS HI PPI LOPS 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
0.693*** 0.691*** 0.684*** 0.727*** 0.730*** 0.721*** 
[0.104] [0.103] [0.104] [0.101] [0.102] [0.101] 
GDP Growth 
-0.452*** -0.455*** -0.470*** -0.555*** -0.539*** -0.540*** 
[0.172] [0.174] [0.171] [0.170] [0.174] [0.168] 
Interest 
0.176* 0.182* 0.201** 0.156* 0.161* 0.168* 
[0.097] [0.097] [0.093] [0.093] [0.095] [0.091] 
Unemployment Rate 
0.029 0.025 0.012 -0.099 -0.081 -0.084 
[0.158] [0.161] [0.157] [0.162] [0.165] [0.158] 
Number of Changes 
in Government 
0.119 0.126 0.141 0.085 0.086 0.097 
[0.514] [0.514] [0.512] [0.493] [0.499] [0.494] 
Centre Executive 
-1.445 -1.497 -1.627 -0.454 -0.732 -0.501 
[1.510] [1.517] [1.484] [1.510] [1.522] [1.523] 
Form of Fiscal Governance 
(Delegation) 
-2.652 -2.221 -0.587 8.610 4.508 7.670 
[3.331] [3.248] [3.419] [5.806] [4.604] [5.033] 
Form of Fiscal Governance 
(Contract) 
-1.550* -1.485 -1.200 -0.504 -0.659 -0.416 
[0.940] [0.989] [0.950] [1.007] [1.045] [0.985] 
Margin to Absolute Majority 
2.645 2.694 2.803 1.093 1.131 0.894 
[4.407] [4.404] [4.394] [4.278] [4.347] [4.329] 
Minority Government 
(Coalition) 
2.058** 2.184** 2.601*** -2.052 -1.153 -2.349 
[0.987] [0.900] [0.967] [2.007] [1.879] [2.462] 
Concentration in Opposition 
0.840 0.219 -1.814 -12.229* -7.211 -10.031** 
[3.621] [3.387] [3.258] [6.612] [4.954] [4.919] 
Minority Gov. (Coalition) * 
Concentration in Opposition 
   13.755** 9.660** 10.409** 
   [5.922] [4.816] [4.793] 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Number of Countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R-squared 0.836 0.835 0.836 0.852 0.848 0.851 
Standard errors in brackets. Country dummies not shown. 














Figure 3: Added variable plot of the minority government and opposition 
concentration interaction 
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